First, this attack was not just on Google. As part of our investigation we have discovered that at least twenty other large companies from a wide range of businesses - including the Internet, finance, technology, media and chemical - are both committed. We are currently in the process of the release of the company, and we are also working with the relevant U.S. authorities. />
Second, we have evidence to suggest that the primary goal of the attackers to access Gmail accounts of Chinese human rights activists. Based on our investigation so far we believe their attack failed (VGP-BPL8, VGP-bpl8a, VGP-BPS9) to achieve this goal. Only two Gmail accounts appear are accessed, and information on account activity (such as the date account was created) and subject line, rather than limited to the content of emails themselves. />
third parties as part of this investigation but independent of the attack on Google, we discovered that the accounts of dozens of US-, China and Europe-based Gmail users advocates of human rights in China that seem to regularly access a third party. These accounts have not been accessed through a security breach at Google, but most likely via phishing or malware placed on the users' computers (VGP-BPS9 / B, VGP-BPS9 / s, VGP- BPS9). />
We got the information from this attack to make infrastructure and architectural improvements that enhance security for Google and for our users to use. In terms of individual users, we would advise that provides reputable anti-virus program and anti-spyware on their computers, to install patches for their operating systems and update their web browsers. Always be careful when out on the links in instant messages and emails, or when asked to provide personal information like passwords online. You can read more here about our cyber-security recommendations. People can learn more about the type of attack (to read this Report to Congress (PDF VGP-BPS9 / B, vgp-BPL9, VGP-BPS10) by the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission see PP 163 -.) and a related study (PDF) for the Commission, Nart Villeneuve's blog and this presentation on the GhostNet spying incident prepared.
We /> unusual step of sharing information about these attacks with a broad audience not just because of the security and human rights implications of what we put unearthed, but also because the information It goes in the middle of a much bigger global debate about freedom of speech. In the last two decades, the economic reform program in China and its people business flair freed hundreds of millions of Chinese out of poverty. Indeed, this great nation is in the midst of much economic development VGP-BPS10 / B, VGP-BPS10 / s, vgp-bps10a and development in the world today. />
We launched Google.cn in January 2006 in the belief that the benefits of increased access to information for people in China and a more open Internet outweighed our discomfort in agreeing to censor some results. By the time we made clear that "we will carefully monitor conditions in China, including new laws and other restrictions on our services. If we determine that we are able to achieve the objectives outlined we are free to rethink our approach (VGP-bps10a / b, vgp-bpl10) China.
